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Abstract:  Consider an n-person Nash Bargaining problem where players bargain 
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  1 Introduction
Imagine a game where rational players bargain over the division of a cake. If the players reach
an agreement, then the cake is split according to that agreement; but if they fail, they walk
away with nothing. It is clear that rational players will strike a mutually benecial deal whereby
each person gets some cake. What is not clear is how much cake each player will get. In a
seminal paper, Nash (1950) devised a simple axiomatic characterization of the solution to this
bargaining problem. Nash's paper has since spawned a vast literature on bargaining theory and
its applications.
Now imagine that the cake is inside a closed box and that the players must agree on how to
divide the cake before the box is opened. This time, rather than knowing how large the cake
is, the players only have beliefs about how large the cake is likely to be. They are still trying
to divide a cake, but now they are also sharing risk. Intuitively, in such a situation, we would
expect risk averse players to forgo larger shares of the cake when the cake is big to insure
themselves against the possibility that the cake is small. On the other hand, we would expect
risk loving players to gamble away small stakes for a chance at having large amounts of cake.
This game can serve as an allegory for many \real" bargaining situations, particularly those
where an unknown amount of money is to be divided.
In this paper, we study the Nash Bargaining Solution in such a game and nd that it conrms
this intuition. We characterise and investigate the solution for the case where n-players with
dierent beliefs bargain over a one-dimensional random variable. We also work through a
specic numerical example to help solidify the reader's intuition. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The Bargaining Problem with Risk
Denition 2.1. For each integer n  1, an n-person Nash Bargaining Problem is any list
(S;d), where S is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of Rn and d is an element of S such
that there exists at least one x 2 S with x  d. Here,  denotes the natural partial order on
Rn | that is, x  y if and only if each component of x is greater than or equal to y.
The set S represents the utility possibility set that arises from agreement between the players,
and d denotes the outcome if the players fail to reach an agreement.
Denition 2.2. Let (S;d) be a Nash Bargaining problem. The Nash Bargaining Solution
is a point c(S;d) in S that satises the following conditions:
(PE) c(S;d) is Pareto ecient; that is, x  c(S;d) implies that x = 2 S.
(AM) c(S;d) is invariant to increasing ane transformations; that is, for each strictly increasing
ane map L on Rn, c(L(S);L(d)) = L(c(S;d)).
(IIA) If T  S and c(S;d) 2 T, then c(T;d) = c(S;d).
1(SYM) If S is symmetric and all players face the same disagreement outcome, then c(S;d) assigns
the same utility to all players.
For a justication of these axioms see Muthoo (1999).





x 2 X : 8(y2X)(f(x)  f(y))
	
:
Theorem 2.1 (Nash). For each n-person Nash Bargaining problem (S;d), the Nash Bargaining





jVi   dij; (1)
where Vi is the ith component of the vector V in S.
Proof. See Ok (2007, pg.542) 
In the rest of this section, for clarity of exposition and simplicity of notation, we will restrict
our attention to the two-person game, and return to the n-person case later.
Suppose that a deterministic one-dimensional cake of size x is shared between players 1 and 2.
If we denote player i's utility function by Vi, then theorem 2.1 implies that (V1( ~ w);V2(x   ~ w))
is the Nash Bargaining Solution, where
~ w 2 argmax
0wx
(V1(w)   d1)(V2(x   w)   d2):
In this case, the cake is partitioned into ~ w and x   ~ w, and using dierential calculus, we can
easily nd this partition. The aim of this paper is to investigate the case where the cake is
a non-trivial random variable. Here, as the number of potential values for the cake increases,
classical calculus methods become more and more cumbersome until they fail altogether when
the number of possible outcomes becomes innite | in these situations, the contract curve
becomes an innite-dimensional object.
More formally, suppose that players 1 and 2 bargain over the partition of a random cake X (a
random variable) with an associated probability measure F (this may correspond to a continu-
ous, discrete or mixed distribution function). Further suppose that F has support 
  R. The
contract curve ~ w corresponding to the Nash Bargaining Solution must then be the solution to
the following optimisation problem:
max
w
(E[U1(w(x))]   d1)(E[U2(x   w(x))]   d2); (2)
where E[] denotes the expectation operator, x the total amount of cake and w(x) the amount
of cake allocated to player 1 given X = x. Due to axiom (AM), we can assume without loss of
generality that the disagreement point (d1;d2) is equal to the origin. For this problem, we can
prove the following theorem.
2Theorem 2.2. For a 2-person Nash Bargaining Problem where a random variable X is being












(F   almost everywhere) (3)
Condition (3) implies that the functional form of the solution is not aected by the distribution
of the random variable. The distribution of X only aects the parameters of the contract curve.
With this theorem in hand, we can make a few observations about the solution. The rst one
concerns the sharing of risk.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that one party is risk neutral, the other is risk averse, and that the
hypotheses of theorem 2.2 are satised. Then the amount of cake allocated to the risk averse
individual will be some xed amount regardless of the outcome.
This is eectively an insurance contract between the risk averse and the risk neutral party.
This result should not come as a surprise and its appearance is a direct consequence of the
Pareto Eciency axiom (PE). The work of Borch (1962) on risk sharing informs us that all
Pareto-ecient risk sharing allocations, such as this bargaining one, will have this property.
In the two-person case, Borch's celebrated result states that to each ecient allocation of
risk there corresponds two positive real numbers 1 and 2 such that the ecient allocation
maximises the function G dened by:
G = 1E(U1(w(x))) + 2E(U2(x   w(x))):
For the Nash Bargaining solution, 1 and 2 are set to equal E(U1( ~ w(x)) and E(U1(x   ~ w(x))
respectively, where ~ w is the optimal contract curve.
The next result focuses on the bargaining aspect of the problem.
Proposition 2.4. If the risk aversion of the risk averse party in proposition 2.3 increases, then
the expected amount of cake he receives decreases.
The following conjecture is a related but more general result.
Conjecture 2.1. If the risk aversion of a player increases, then their expected share of the cake
decreases.
This seems intuitively plausible, however a proof remains elusive. Note that by \expected share
of the cake", we refer to the expectation of the contract curve rather than the contract curve
itself. In particular, if the risk aversion of a party increases, this does not imply that their share
of the cake becomes smaller everywhere.
32.1 Diering Beliefs
In order to reason about players with dierent beliefs, we need to rule out a potential pathology.
Let (
;B(
);Fi) denote the probability space associated with player i's beliefs about the cake,
where B(
) is a suitable -algebra. We make the assumption that
8(A2B(
))(Fi(A) = 0 () Fj(A) = 0): (4)
In words, if one player believes that an event will occur with probability 0, then so too does
the other. This assumption rules out the degenerate case where one player believes an event
will occur with positive probability while the other believes it will occur with zero probability.
Intuitively, if this were to happen, then axiom (PE) would dictate that all the cake be given to
the rst player in that event. We choose to ignore uninteresting degenerate cases like this and
focus instead on the case where players assign nonzero probabilities to the same events.
Note that (4) is not critical to our analysis; we can discard it simply by invoking the Lebesgue
decomposition theorem. This theorem allows us to decompose Fi into F1
i and F2
i , where F1
i is
absolutely continuous with respect to Fj and F2
i is singular with respect to Fj. We can then
carry out our analysis on each part separately. This exercise would complicate the analysis but
yield no new insights.
Theorem 2.5. Consider a 2-person Nash Bargaining problem where a random variable X is
being shared. Suppose that the probability measures F1 and F2 denote the beliefs of the players,












(F1   almost everywhere) (5)
where f is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of F2 with respect to F1.
In the case where both players believe that the cake is a continuous random variable with density











The introduction of diering beliefs adds a great deal of realism to the problem. We now see
the surprising fact that beliefs can oset risk aversion | that is, an optimistic risk averse player
can take on more risk than a pessimistic risk loving player. No longer is there necessarily an
\insurance" contract between risk averse and risk neutral players. We can still however say the
following:
Proposition 2.6. Given the hypothesis of theorem 2.5, suppose that one party is risk averse
and the other is risk neutral. If the risk aversion of the risk averse party increases, then the
expected amount of cake he receives decreases.
This proposition directly generalises proposition 2.4 to the case where the players have dierent
beliefs.
42.2 n-Players
We now generalise our result to the n-person case. The result, though a direct extension, is
much more cumbersome to write.
Theorem 2.7. Consider an n-person Nash Bargaining problem where a random variable X is
being shared. Suppose that the probability measure Fi denotes player i's beliefs, and that (4)
holds. Then the contract vector ( ~ w1(x);:::; ~ wn(x))) denoting the amount of cake allocated to











(Fi   almost everywhere) (6)
for every i = 1;:::;n   1, where gi is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Fn with respect to Fi.
We also have that ~ wn(x)  x  
Pn 1
i=1 ~ wi(x):














where fi is the density function characterizing player i's beliefs.
3 Worked Example
Example 3.1. Consider the case where the utility functions Ua and Ub of player A and B are
Ua(x) :=
p
x and Ub(x) := log(1 + x):
Suppose further that the cake is continuously distributed and its support is some set 
 of non-
negative real numbers. By theorem 2.2, the contract curve ~ w, specifying player A's share of
cake, will satisfy








E(logx   ~ w(x))
(almost everywhere):
We can easily solve this to nd that
~ w(x) = 22 + 1 + x + 2
p




E(log(x   ~ w))
:
Note that because the players held the same beliefs, we did not need to know the distribution
of the cake to nd the functional form of the contract curve. If we had specied a distribution
for the cake, it would now be a simple matter to numerically solve for the value of the constant
. 
54 Appendix: Proofs
Before we begin, we need some ancillary results from nonlinear analysis. For a more detailed
treatment of this, consult a specialised text like Zeidler (1995, Chap 4.). If you are familiar
with even the basic properties of G^ ateaux derivatives, the following subsection can be skipped.
4.1 Mathematical Machinery
Denition 4.1. Let (X;k  kx) and (Y;k  ky) be two normed linear spaces, and T a subset of
X. For any x0 in the interior of T, a map f : T ! Y is said to be G^ ateaux dierentiable at
x0 if there is a bounded linear operator f;x0 such that
lim
t!0
kf(x0 + th)   f(x0)   f;x0(th)ky
t
= 0 (7)
for all h 2 X. We call the linear operator f;x0 the G^ ateaux derivative of f at x0.
Proposition 4.1. Let S be an open subset of a normed linear space X, and f be a mapping








is the G^ ateaux derivative of f at x if and only if it is a linear functional of h.
Theorem 4.2 (Fermat's Theorem). A necessary condition for a G^ ateaux dierentiable func-
tional  to have an extremum at ^ x is that the G^ ateaux derivative ;^ x be the zero operator.
4.2 Proof of Claims
With the aid of the above results, in particular Fermat's theorem (theorem 4.2), we can set to
work proving the claims made in this paper.
Proof of theorem 2.7. Let w = (w1;:::;wn) be each player's share of the cake. Since the shares
must add to the total amount of cake available, we can write










to prove the theorem.
6Let h = (h1;:::;hn 1;0), where each hi is a function of x. By proposition 4.1 and the product



































































































i denotes the derivative of Ui. By theorem 4.2, the G^ ateaux derivative of J at the
optimum contract curve ~ w is identically zero. In particular, J; ~ w = 0 when hk = 0 for every



















~ wi(x))hi(x)dFn(x) = 0
for each 1  i  n 1 and every admissible hi. Since for nontrivial cakes E(Uk( ~ w)) 6= 0(1  k  n ),














~ wi(x))hi(x)dFn(x) = 0; (8)
for every admissible hi. By (4) and the Radon-Nikodym theorem, there exists a measurable
function gi, known as the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Fn with respect to Fi, that allows us
to write (8) as


















(E(Un( ~ wn))Ui(w(x))   E(Ui( ~ wi))U0
n( ~ wn(x))gi(x))hi(x)dFi(x):
By the fundamental lemma of the calculus of variations, we infer that
E(Un( ~ wn))U0
i( ~ wi(x))   E(Un( ~ wi))U0
n( ~ wn(x))gi(x) = 0 (Fi   almost everywhere):
7Recall that the nonnegativity condition implies that ~ wn(x)  x 
Pn 1 ~ wi(x). So, by rearrang-










(Fi   almost everywhere):
This completes the proof. 
Proof of theorems 2.2 and 2.5. These follow directly from theorem 2.7. 
Proof of proposition 2.3. Without loss of generality, suppose that player 2 is risk neutral. Then
U2(x   w(x))  x   w(x):
Hence by theorem 2.2, we can write
U0
1( ~ w(x)) =
E(U1( ~ w(x)))
E(x   ~ w(x))
:
Since player 1 is risk averse, U0
1 is monotonic and therefore invertible. Thus we can write
~ w(x) = (U0
1) 1() (F   almost everywhere)
where  is the constant dened by:
 :=
E(U1( ~ w(x)))
E(x   ~ w(x))
:

Proof of proposition 2.4. Suppose that the utility function of the risk averse player is u1 and
the contract curve is the constant w1. Now suppose that u1 is replaced by u2, where u2 is more
risk averse than u1 | that is u2   (u1) for some increasing concave function  .
Dene a new utility function
v(t) := t (u1) + (1   t)u1;





We can think of the optimum contract w to be a function of t. It is easy to show that this
function is well-dened. We can dierentiate w implicitly with respect to t to get
 0(u1(w))u0
















dt (E(x)   w) +  (u1(w))dw
dt
(E(x)   w)2 :





1(w))2 + t 0(u1(w))u00









= (1    0(u1(w)))u0
1(w):
We know that the set
fui(w(t)) : t 2 [0;1]g
is a compact subset of strictly positive real numbers, since w(t) must maximise a Nash product.
Hence this set contains a nonzero minimum . The number  0()   0(ui(w(t))) > 0 for
t 2 [0;1]. Hence, by using axiom (AM) and dividing   by  0(), we can assume without loss of




Therefore, we conclude that w(0) < w(1) | that is, w1 is greater than w2. 
Proof of proposition 2.6. The proof is similar to that of proposition 2.4. 
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